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EIGHTH AMENDMENT-THE DEATH
PENALTY AND THE MENTALLY
RETARDED CRIMINAL: FAIRNESS,
CULPABILITY, AND DEATH
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Penry v. Lynaugh, I the Supreme Court decided that the Texas
statutory scheme for the death penalty must allow a sentencer to
consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating circumstances of
the defendant when assessing the death penalty.2 The Court also
decided that it is not cruel and unusual punishment to sentence a
mentally retarded criminal to death.3
This Note concludes that the Penry decision on the Texas statu-
tory scheme was consistent with the judicial policies of providing
individualized treatment of the capital defendant while avoiding the
application of the death penalty in an arbitrary, capricious, or freak-
ish manner.
This Note also argues that the Court should have decided that
the death penalty for the mentally retarded is a cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the eighth amendment because the men-
tally retarded criminal lacks the degree of culpability proportionate
to the death penalty. Furthermore, since the Court is uncertain
about the culpability of a mentally retarded criminal, it should reject
capital punishment for the mentally retarded criminal rather than
risk sentencing a defendant to a cruel and unusual punishment. The
Court cannot take this risk because the death penalty is unique in its
finality and harshness.
Finally, the Court's rulings in Penry, along with its voting pat-
tern in the decision, have important implications for capital punish-
ment cases which the Supreme Court may review in the future.
1 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
2 Id. at 2952.





Pamela Carpenter was brutally raped, beaten, and stabbed with
a pair of scissors in her home in Livingston, Texas on October 25,
1979. 4 Several hours after the attack, she died while receiving emer-
gency treatment for her injuries.5 Before Carpenter died, she gave
the police a description of the attacker, leading two police officers to
suspect Johnny Paul Penry, who was just recently paroled for an-
other rape charge.6 Penry confessed to committing the crime and
the state of Texas charged him with capital murder.7
Arresting and charging Penry was only the beginning of a very
long journey through complex judicial and constitutional issues.
,Because Penry was mentally retarded, this case was different from
other capital murder cases. Penry was diagnosed with organic brain
damage when he was a child.8 Since his childhood, his intelligence
quotient (IQ) was between fifty and sixty-three, a level associated
with mild to moderate retardation.9 At a competency hearing held
before the trial, Dr. Jerome Brown, a clinical psychologist, testified
that Penry was mentally retarded and that Penry had an IQ of fifty-
four. Dr. Brown testified that Penry had the learning ability of a six
and one-half year old and the social maturity, or the ability to func-
tion in the world, of a nine or ten year old, although Penry was actu-
ally twenty-two years old at the time of the crime.' 0 Finally, Doctor
Brown testified that "there's a point at which anyone with [Penry's]
IQ is always competent, but, you know, this man is more in the
borderline."'"
B. THE TRIAL
After the jury decided that Penry was competent to stand trial,
the defense counsel raised an insanity defense by presenting expert
testimony concluding that Penry, as a result of his mental retarda-
4 Id. at 2941.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. In his confessions, Penry described how he had beaten and raped Carpenter
and later stabbed her in the chest with a pair of scissors. In his second confession, Penry
stated the following: "I knew that if I went over to the Chick's [deceased] house and
raped her that I would have to kill her because she would tell who I was to the police and
I didn't want to go back to the pen." Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636, 641 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985).
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tion, was incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his act or to
conform his acts to the law. 12 The defense also presented evidence
showing that Penry was a physically-abused child. 13 The prosecu-
tion refuted the evidence by introducing the testimony of experts
stating that while Penry had limited mental abilities, he was not in-
sane and he knew the difference between right and wrong. 14 The
prosecution's expert witnesses testified that Penry had an antisocial
personality. 15 Although they disagreed with the defense witnesses'
views that Penry was insane, the prosecution's expert witnesses did
agree that Penry had extremely limited mental ability and was un-
able to learn from his mistakes. 16 The jury rejected the insanity de-
fense and found Penry guilty of capital murder. 17
C. THE SENTENCE
At the end of the sentencing hearing, the jury had to decide on
the following "special issues" in order to decide whether Penry
would receive life imprisonment or the death penalty.
1. Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the
deceased was committed deliberately and with reasonable expecta-
tion that the death of the deceased or another would result;
2. Whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society; and
3. If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in
killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provoca-
tion, if any, by the deceased.' 8
Under the Texas Criminal Code, if the jury unanimously answers
"yes" to all of the above special issues, the trial court must sentence
the defendant to death. 19 If the jury anwers no to any of the above
issues, the sentence must be life imprisonment.20
The defense counsel made several objections to the proposed
charge to the jury. First, the defense objected to the failure of the
court to define terms in the special issues such as "deliberately" in
the first issue and "probability," "criminal acts of violence," and
"continuing threat to society" in the second issue.2 1 Second, the
12 Id.
13 Id.




18 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1989).
19 Id. at art. 37.071(c)-(e).
20 Id.
21 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2942.
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defense objected to the lack of authorization for a jury to grant
mercy based on mitigating circumstances. 22 Third, the defense ar-
gued that the trial court should have required that the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that mitigating circumstances do
not outweigh aggravating circumstances as a condition of assessing
the death penalty.23 Fourth, the defense objected that allowing the
jury to assess the death penalty would go against the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.24
The trial court overruled these objections and the judge in-
structed the jury that the prosecution has the burden of proof on the
special issues and that the jury must believe beyond a reasonable
doubt that their answers to the "special issues" are correct.2 5 The
jury may also consider all evidence given at trial and at the sentenc-
ing hearing when deciding the three special issues.26 The jury an-
swered "yes" on all three issues and the trial court sentenced Penry
to death. 27
D. THE APPEAL
The defense appealed the conviction and sentence to the Court
of Criminal Appeals of Texas. 28 The appeals court rejected the de-
fendant's appeals concerning illegal arrest and illegal police proce-
dures in obtaining Penry's confession. 29 It also rejected claims that
certain evidence and testimonies were inadmissible. 30 It found that
there was sufficient evidence to justify the jury's affirmative answers
to the three special issues. 31 The court ruled that terms in the spe-
cial issues did not need further definition since the jury understood
their common meaning. 32 Citing Jurek v. Texas,33 which upheld
Texas' statutory scheme for imposing the death penalty, the Texas
appellate court concluded that since the court allowed the defense




25 Id. at 2943.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
29 Id. at 642-46. The court decided that the police officers gave Penry sufficient warn-
ings before obtaining Penry's confession. Id. The court also decided that since the po-
lice officially arrested Penry only after Penry confessed, the arrest was not illegal. Id.
30 Id. at 646-52 (statements made by victim that she was stabbed and raped were
admissible as hearsay exceptions because they are spontaneous exclamations).
31 Id. at 652-53.
32 Id. at 653-54.
33 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
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sentencing hearing, there was no need for the trial court to give a
special instruction requiring the jury to compare the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances of the defendant before imposing the
death penalty.34 In short, the court found that the Constitution did
not require a special jury instruction to supplement the Texas statu-
tory scheme for the death penalty. Finally, the court found no con-
stitutional impediments against the death penalty for the mentally
retarded.35
After the Texas appellate court upheld Penry's conviction and
sentence, the defense filed a federal habeas corpus petition chal-
lenging the death penalty. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit reviewed the case after the district court rejected the appeal.3 6
The court found that although evidence of mitigating circumstances
concerning Penry's mental retardation, abused childhood, and emo-
tional problems were presented to the jury, the special issues under
the Texas Criminal Code did not allow the jury to give effect to these
mitigating factors in imposing the sentence. 37 While questioning
the wisdom of the cases, the court decided that sinceJurek upheld
the Texas statutes for the death penalty and since other Fifth Circuit
decisions38 rejected claims similar to Penry's, it had no choice but to
uphold Penry's sentence. 39 Citing another Fifth Circuit case,40 the
court held that it was not cruel and unusual punishment to execute a
mentally retarded person.4 ' Thus, the court relied heavily on stare
decisis in upholding Penry's death sentence.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review Penry's death
sentence. 42 Specifically, the Supreme Court considered the follow-
ing two issues:
[1)] [W]as Penry sentenced to death in violation of the Eight Amend-
ment because the jury was not adequately instructed to take into
consideration all of his mitigating evidence and because the terms
34 Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
35 Id. at 654-55.
36 Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1987).
37 Id. at 920.
38 See Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 952-53 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that the Texas
death penalty statute did not prevent a jury from considering the defendant's mental
insanity as a mitigating factor); Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 675-77 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1982) (finding that the jury was not precluded from consider-
ing the defendant's mental condition as a mitigating factor when deciding the special
issues under the Texas death penalty statute).
39 832 F.2d at 926.
40 Brogdon v. Butler, 824 F.2d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 1987) (Death penalty for the men-
tally retarded is not cruel and unusual punishment because of mentally retarded per-
sons' ability to distinguish between right and wrong).
41 832 F.2d at 918.
42 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
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in the Texas special issues were not defined in such a way that the
jury could consider and give effect to his mitgating evidence in
answering them?
[2)] [I]s it cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amend-
ment to execute a mentally retarded person with Penry's reason-
ing ability?43
III. OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court remanded Penry's sentence to the trial
court after reversing the Fifth Circuit ruling that upheld the applica-
tion of the Texas statutory scheme for imposing the death penalty in
Penry's case, and affirming the Fifth Circuit ruling that it is not cruel
and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment to execute a
mentally retarded person with Penry's reasoning ability.4 4
Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion announcing the judgment
of the Court.4 5 However, there were some very interesting align-
ments by otherjustices concerning the opinion. Fourjustices, Bren-
nan, Marshall, Blackmum, and Stevens, joined Justice O'Connor in
the part of her opinion which overruled the Texas statutory scheme
on imposing the death penalty as applied to Penry.4 6 An entirely
different group of justices, Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Kennedy,
joined the part of Justice O'Connor's opinion which ruled that the
death penalty for the mentally retarded with Penry's reasoning abili-
ties is not cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amend-
ment.4 7 Thus while there is a majority opinion, the makeup of the
majority varied according to the particular issue of the case the
Court was addressing.
Furthermore, Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Marshall joined.48 Jus-
43 Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2943-44 (1989).
44 Id. at 2952, 2958. As a threshold issue, the Court also ruled that granting defend-
ant's request for relief would not impermissibly impose the "new rule" retroactively, as
prohibited by the Supreme Court's decision in Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
Id. at 2944-45. The plurality opinion in Teague held that new rules will not be applied or
announced in cases on collateral review, but for two exceptions. Id. at 1072-75. The
Court stated that new rules announced in collateral review of sentences in criminal judg-
ments would "delay the enforcement of the judgment at issue and decrease the possibil-
ity that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation." Id.
at 1077 n.3. (citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 25 (1963)). For in-depth dis-
cussion and analysis of the Teague decision, see Note, Sixth Amendment-The Evolution of the
Supreme Court's Retroactivity Doctrine: A Futile Search for Theoretical Clarity, 80J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY (1990).
45 Pen-y, 109 S. Ct. at 2940.
46 Id. at 2958, 2963.
47 Id. at 2963.
48 Id. at 2958-63.
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tice Stevens also filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, in which Justice Blackmum joined.49 Finally, Justice Scalia
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy joined.50
A. THE MAJORITY
Justice O'Connor first discussed the issue of whether the appli-
cation of the Texas statutory scheme for imposing the death penalty
allowed the jury to consider all relevant mitigating factors concern-
ing Penry and thus was constitutional under the eighth amend-
ment.5 ' She then discussed the merits of the issue concerning the
Texas "special issues." Citing Lockett v. Ohio52 and Eddings v.
Oklahoma,53 Justice O'Connor pointed out the principle that "pun-
ishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the
criminal defendant."' 54 Justice O'Connor explained that when a
sentencer makes an individualized assessment of whether to impose
the death penalty, he/she must consider the defendant's back-
ground and character since defendants with disadvantaged back-
grounds and emotional and mental problems are viewed by society
as less culpable than defendants without such handicaps. 55 Specifi-
cally, Justice O'Connor continued, not only must evidence of the
defendant's mitigating circumstances be presented to the sentencer,
the sentencer must also be able to consider and give effect to these
circumstances when imposing the sentence. 56 According to Justice
O'Connor, the policy goals are to treat the defendant as a
" 'uniquely individual human bein[g]' " and then impose a sentence
which " 'reflect[s] a reasoned moral response to the defendant's
background, character, and crime.' 57
Justice O'Connor next discussed whether the Texas statutory
schemes allowed the sentencer to fulfill these goals. She noted that,
whileJurek 58 had upheld the Texas statutory scheme for the death
49 Id. at 2963.
50 Id. at 2963-69.
51 Id. at 2947. As a threshold matter, Justice O'Connor decided that a ruling on this
issue would not violate the Teague decision. She reasoned that such a ruling would be
consistent with past precedents and thus would not be a new rule as prohibited by
Teague. Id. at 2945-47.
52 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
53 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
54 109 S. Ct. at 2947.
55 Id. at 2947 (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)).
56 Id. (citing Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987)).
57 Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304; 305 (1976), and Cali-
fornia v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)) (emphasis in original).
58 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
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penalty, it was subsequently understood by the Court thatJurek had
upheld the. "special issues" on the expressed assurance that the
"special issues" would be interpreted broadly to allow the jury to
consider all relevant mitigating factors. 59 Justice O'Connor noted
that the plurality opinion in Franklin v. Lynaugh 60 confirmed this in-
terpretation ofJurek, and the Franklin plurality further required that
the special issues must allow the juries to give effect to the mitigating
circumstances of the defendant. 6 1 Thus Justice O'Connor in effect
argued that past precedents do not necessarily guarantee the consti-
tutionality of the Texas statutory schemes. Instead, she explained,
the statute's constitutionality depends on whether the "special is-
sues" allow thejury to consider and give effect to the particular miti-
gating circumstances of a defendant in each case.62
Justice O'Connor then analyzed textually the three "special is-
sues" to determine whether they allowed the jury to consider and
give effect to Penry's mental retardation and abused childhood in
determining whether Penry should be sentenced to death. On the
first special issue of whether the defendant had acted "deliberately
and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased
or another would result," 63 Justice O'Connor interpreted "deliber-
ately" to mean "intentionally. ' ' 64 However, she pointed out that
personal culpability is not only determined by deliberateness. 65 Ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor, it is possible for the jury to find that
Penry's mental retardation diminished his moral culpability because
such mental handicaps may lessen his ability to control his impulse
or judge the consequences. 66 However, she continued, the jury
would still have to say that he acted deliberately.67 Thus Justice
O'Connor concluded that without a special instruction allowing the
jury to give effect to the mitigating factors, a juror may believe that
Penry's mental retardation lessened his culpability and still answer
"yes" to Penry's deliberateness. 68
59 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2948.
60 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
61 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2948 (citing Franklin, 487 U.S. at 164). Franklin upheld the Texas
"special issues" in that instance because two concurring justices decided that a jury
could have given effect to a defendant's mitigating evidence of good behavior by answer-
ing "no" to the question of future dangerousness of the defendant. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
62 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2945.
63 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1989).
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As to the second issue concerning the defendant's future dan-
gerousness, Justice O'Connor stated that Penry's inability to learn
from past mistakes would only make his mental retardation an ag-
gravating factor.69 Justice O'Connor thus concluded that the sec-
ond special issue failed to provide a "vehicle" for the jury to give
effect to Penry's mental retardation as a mitigating factor. 70
Finally, on the third special issue, Justice O'Connor concluded
that it was possible for the jury to find Penry's actions to be an un-
reasonable response to any possible provocations by the deceased
and still decide that Penry's mental retardation lessened his
culpability. 71
Justice O'Connor noted that the defense suggested to the jury
that it could purposely ignore the meaning and terms of the special
issues and simply answer "no" to the special issues in order to give
effect to mitigating factors which were not included by the text of
the special issues.72 However, Justice O'Connor stated that since
the prosecution urged the jury to follow the law and follow the in-
structions concerning the issues, it was reasonable that a juror may
have been unable to find a "vehicle" to give effect to Penry's miti-
gating circumstances. 73
Justice O'Connor concluded that a jury's discretionary grant of
mercy based on Penry's mitigating circumstances would not be an
"unbridled discretion" in imposing the death penalty, which was
prohibited by Furman v. Georgia.74 She noted that the Court had
prohibited the capricious imposition of capital punishment on a se-
lected group of offenders and therefore had required in Gregg v.
Georgia75 that there must be standards to guide the review of a de-
fendant's circumstances relative to the imposition of capital punish-
ment. 76 However, Justice O'Connor stated that Gregg also decided
that if the class of murderers at issue was narrowed, then a proce-
dure to allow ajury's discretionary grant of mercy due to mitigating
factors was constitutional. 77 She explained that a grant of mercy
within the narrowed class of mentally retarded criminals would be
consistent with Gregg. Thus Justice O'Connor concluded that an in-
struction authorizing the jury to give effect to Penry's mitigating cir-
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 2950.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 2951; see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
75 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
76 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2951 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199).
77 Id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197-99, 203).
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cumstances would provide the jury with a "vehicle" to express its
"reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, charac-
ter, and crime."7 8 Justice O'Connor stated that if ajury is unable to
consider and give effect to all the relevant mitigating evidence con-
cerning the defendant, the jury may end up giving "an unguided
emotional response" in imposing the death penalty.79
Next, Justice O'Connor discussed whether it is cruel and unu-
sual punishment under the eighth amendment to sentence a men-
tally retarded person of Penry's reasoning abilities to death.80
In terms of the merits of the issue, Justice O'Connor concluded
that capital punishment for the mentally retarded of Penry's reason-
ing abilities was not cruel and unusual under traditional common
law.8 ' According to Justice O'Connor, common law prohibited cap-
ital punishment for "idiots," a term used to describe persons with
absolutely no ability to reason, understand, or distinguish between
good and evil.8 2 The common law "idiot" would be so severely re-
tarded, she explained, that the modern judicial doctrine of insanity
defense would prevent him/her from being convicted.8 3 Justice
O'Connor noted that Penry was held to be competent to stand trial
and had a rational understanding of the proceedings. Furthermore,
she noted that his insanity defense was rejected, which means that
the jury believed Penry could distinguish between right and
wrong.8 4 Justice O'Connor thus concluded that Penry would not be
considered an "idiot" as protected by the common law.8 5
Justice O'Connor found no emerging national consensus ex-
pressing an evolving standard against the execution of the mentally
retarded.8 6 Rejecting the defense's use of a national poll, Justice
O'Connor stated that the only objective evidence of national con-
sensus are actions of the legislatures and that only one state has
banned the execution of mentally retarded criminals.8 7
78 Id. at 2951 (citing Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 2333 (1988)).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 2952-58. As a threshold matter, Justice O'Connor decided that if the Court
ruled that the death penalty for Penry was a cruel and unusual punishment, it would not
be a violation of the Teague rule. Id. at 2952-53. Because such a ruling would exclude a
class of individuals from a state sentence, it would be analogous to the exception to the
Teague rule which allows for new rules in collateral review excluding certain private activ-
ities from state regulation. Id.
81 Id. at 2954.
82 Id. at 2953.
83 Id. at 2954.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 2955.
87 Id.
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Justice O'Connor admitted that because the two major goals of
capital punishment are deterrence and retribution, and because ret-
ribution depends on a criminal's culpability, a defendant's mental
retardation may reduce or totally exculpate the defendant's culpa-
bility 88 Thus, she explained, a defendant's culpability must be pro-
portional to his sentence. 89 Justice O'Connor stated that mentally
retarded people are individuals with various abilities and exper-
iences.90 She cited the example of mental retardation ameliorated
by education and life experience.9 1 Justice O'Connor could not
conclude that all mentally retarded people of Penry's ability, solely
because of the mental retardation, lack the mental ability which
allow them to have the culpability proportional to a death sen-
tence.92 Finally, Justice O'Connor concluded that since Penry's
mental retardation would be allowed to be considered and given ef-
fect by a jury in imposing the death penalty, she could not rule that
the death penalty for mentally retarded criminals like Penry is
unconstitutional. 93
B. JUSTICE BRENNAN, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in part
and dissented in part.94 He concurred with Justice O'Connor's
opinion that the Texas "special issues" did not allow the jury to
consider and give effect to Penry's mental retardation and abused
childhood.95
Justice Brennan dissented with the part of the opinion which
held that capital punishment for mentally retarded criminals with
Penry's reasoning abilities was not cruel and unusual under the
eighth amendment. 96 While Justice Brennan supported Justice
O'Connor's requirement that a mentally retarded person must have
the mental capabilities to have the degree of culpability justifying
88 Id. at 2956.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 2957.
91 Id. Justice O'Connor explained that some mentally retarded persons are fully ca-
pable of functioning in their communities even though they have difficulties learning
from their experience. Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 2958.
94 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan
agreed that the Court's rulings would.not violate the Teague rule although he disagreed
with the Teague rule as a whole because the decision "prevents the vindication of per-
sonal constitutional rights and deprives our society of a significant safeguard against
future violations." Id. at 2958-59 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
96 Id. at 2960 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
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the death penalty, Justice Brennan disagreed with Justice O'Connor
by concluding that all mentally retarded persons are not capable of
having such a degree of culpability.9 7 Justice Brennan agreed with
Justice O'Connor that mentally retarded people may have very dif-
ferent levels of skills and mental abilities because of education and
life experience; however, Justice Brennan argued that all mentally
retarded persons are, by clinical definition, substantially disabled in
cognitive ability and adaptive behavior.98 Thus, Justice Brennan
concluded that mentally retarded persons by definition are so handi-
capped in their "reasoning abilities, control over impulsive behav-
ior, and moral development" that mentally retarded offenders will
always have diminished cupability.99 Therefore death penalties for
mentally retarded criminals would always be cruel and unusual.' 00
Justice Brennan stated that ajury's consideration of mental retarda-
tion as a mitigating factor would not guarantee that mentally re-
tarded persons would not be executed; thus, there would still be the
risk of cruel and unusual punishment. 10 '
Furthermore, Justice Brennan argued that capital punishment
for the mentally retarded would not achieve the goals of retribution
and deterrence because of the mentally retarded persons' dimin-
ished culpability and impaired control of impulses. ' 02 Thus, he con-
cluded, the penalty would be " 'nothing more than the purposeless
and needless imposition of pain and suffering.' ",103
C. JUSTICE STEVENS, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmum, agreed with the
Court's ruling concerning the Texas "special issues" failure to allow
the jury to consider and give effect to Penry's mental retardation
and abused childhood as mitigating factors in imposing the death
penalty. 10 4 Without much elaboration, Justice Stevens also con-
cluded that the death penalty for the mentally retarded offender was
unconstitutional under the eighth amendment.' 0 5
97 Id. at 2960-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
98 Id. at 2961 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
99 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
100 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
101 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
102 Id. at 2962 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
103 Id. at 2963 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977)).
104 Id. at 2963 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens
also agreed that the Court's ruling would not violate the Teague rule, although he dis-
agreed with the entire Teague decision. Id. (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
105 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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D. JUSTICE SCALIA, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices White and Kennedy and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, disagreed with the part of Justice O'Connor's
opinion concerning the mitigation issue relative to the Texas "spe-
cial issues." 1 06 He stated that the Court's ruling was inconsistent
with past Court precedents.' 0 7 Justice Scalia also concurred with
O'Connor's conclusion that the death penalty for mentally retarded
criminals is not cruel and unusual.' 08
As to the merits of the Court's ruling on the mitigation issue,
Justice Scalia stated that Gregg required a state's statutory scheme
for imposing the death penalty to strike a proper balance between
capricious imposition and unduly constricted discretion by channel-
ing a sentencer's discretion without excessively restricting it. 109 Jus-
tice Scalia argued that the Court's ruling in Jurek found the Texas
scheme to have struck such a balance in channeling a sentencer's
discretion. 110 Aside from the argument that Texas has a right to
channel a sentencer's discretion through the "special issues," Jus-
tice Scalia argued that the particular terminology used, such as "de-
liberateness," was relevant to Penry's mental retardation.1 1'
Because Texas allows all mitigating evidence to be introduced, Jus-
tice Scalia concluded that the channeling of the jury's consideration
of such evidence was not unconstitutional.1 12 Indeed, Justice Scalia
argued that O'Connor's requirement of the jury to be allowed to
consider and give effect to all mitigating evidence would return the
law to the "'wholly arbitrary and capricious action'" that had been
forbidden by past Court decisions. 113
IV. ANALYSIS
A. THE SCOPE OF A SENTENCER'S DISCRETION: MITIGATING FACTORS
IN APPLYING THE DEATH PENALTY
In order to determine whether the Court decided correctly on
106 Id. at 2964 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As a threshold
issue,Justice Scalia concluded that the Court's ruling on the "special issues" was a viola-
tion of the Teague rule. Id. at 2963-64 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
107 Id. at 2965 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108 Id. at 2964 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
109 Id. at 2965 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976)).
110 Id. at 2966 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); see Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274
(1976).
111 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2966 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
112 Id. at 2968 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
113 Id. at 2968 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189).
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the issue concerning the Texas death penalty statute, one must con-
sider two policy goals which the Court has adhered to in previous
cases dealing with the death penalty. In Lockett, "14 the Court stated
that individualized decisions in death penalty cases are necessary so
that a sentencer will "[treat] each defendant in a capital case with
that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual .... " 15
Another policy goal which was announced by the Court in Furman
states that a sentencer must not impose the death penalty in an arbi-
trary, capricous, or freakish manner.1 6 Thus, whether the Penry
Court ruled correctly depends on the Court's decision to allow a
sentencer to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating fac-
tors of a defendant.
The Court's decision to allow a jury to consider and give effect
to all relevant mitigating factors of a defendant is a logical result of
Lockett and its policy goal. 117 In Lockett, a plurality of the Court over-
turned the Ohio death penalty statute because it only allowed the
sentencer to consider three mitigating factors specified by the stat-
ute. ' 8 The plurality stated that "a death penalty statute must not
preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors." 1 9 In Ed-
dings,120 the Court reaffirmed the Lockett plurality when it overruled
the trial court's decision that, as a matter of law, it could not con-
sider as mitigating factors a defendant's troubled family history,
abused childhood, and emotional problems. '21 Reaffirming Lockett's
emphasis on individualized treatment of defendants in capital cases,
the Eddings Court reasoned that just as a statute cannot preclude the
consideration of any relevant mitigating factors, a sentencer cannot,
as a matter of law, refuse to consider any relevant mitigating evi-
dence of a defendant when deciding whether or not to impose the
death penalty. 122 Thus the Penry decision is correct in requiring that
a sentencer consider all relevant mitigating evidence.
The crucial question in Penry is whether it is necessary for the
114 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
15 Id. at 605 (Burger, CJ., plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor explained in Penry
that the Lockett Court's emphasis on individualized treatment is based on the principle
that the level of punishment should be directly related to a criminal's degree of culpabil-
ity. 109 S. Ct. at 2947. A defendant's background, character, and mental state can affect
.his level of culpability. Id. (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)).
116 408 U.S. 238, 274, 295 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); 408 U.S. 238, 309-10
(1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
117 See supra note 114 for a discussion of the Lockett Court's policy goal.
118 438 U.S. at 608 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
119 Id.
120 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
121 Id. at 110, 117.
122 Id. at 113-14.
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sentencer to be able to apply or give effect to a defendant's mitigat-
ing circumstances in order to satisfy the Lockett requirement of indi-
vidualized treatment of the defendant. 23 For instance, in his
dissent in Penry, Justice Scalia argued that the Texas death penalty
statute was constitutional because the jury was able to consider all
mitigating evidence in answering the special issues. 124 Justice Scalia
argued that while a sentencer should be able to consider all mitigat-
ing evidence, it is up to the state to determine for what purposes
and in what ways the sentencer may give effect to the mitigating
evidence. 125
The problem with Justice Scalia's reasoning is that limiting the
purposes and ways a sentencer may apply or give effect to a mitigat-
ing factor is just another name for limiting the mitigating factors a
sentencer may consider, which, of course, was prohibited by Lock-
ett. 126 If a state limits the ways a sentencer may apply or give effect
to mitigating factors, certain mitigating factors which may be rele-
vant to the character of the defendant will have no weight to the
purposes and issues mandated by the state.
Take Penry's mental retardation, for example. Although the
defense presented evidence of Penry's mental retardation to the
sentencing jury, 127 the evidence had no relevance to the three "spe-
cial issues."1 28 Thus, Penry's mental retardation meant nothing to
the jury although Penry's mental abilities were clearly relevant to his
character and background, which, in turn, were relevant to his cul-
pability and to the question of whether he deserved the death pen-
123 The answer to this question will also determine whether Penry is consistent with
the Court's decision in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Jurek upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Texas statutory scheme for the death sentence. Id. Justice O'Connor
interpreted Jurek narrowly and concluded that the "special issues" are only constitu-
tional as long as they allow the sentencer to "fully consider" the relevant mitigating
circumstances of the defendant. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2951 (1989). Jus-
tice O'Connor argued that full consideration requires the jury to be able to give effect to
the mitigating factors. Id. Writing separately, Justice Scalia argued that full considera-
tion of mitigating circumstance does not mean a jury can give effect to the mitigating
factors. Id. at 2966 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor's definition means that Penry is consistent withJurek andJustice Scalia's defini-
tion means that Penry is overrulingJurek.
124 109 S. Ct. at 2967.
125 Id. at 2966 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus according
to justice Scalia's reasoning, the Texas death penalty statute would allow for individual-
ized treatment by allowing the sentencer to consider all mitigating circumstances. How-
ever, the sentencer is only allowed to give effect to the mitigating evidence for the
purpose of answering the three "special issues." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
126 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (Burger, CJ., plurality opinion).
127 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2950.
128 Id. at 2951.
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alty. In effect, the jury never really considered Penry's mental
retardation. As pointed out in the concurrence in Franklin, "the
right to have the sentencer consider and weigh relevant mitigating
evidence would be meaningless unless the sentencer was also per-
mitted to give effect to its consideration."1 29 Justice Scalia's reason-
ing is a clever means of undermining the Lockett mandate of
individualized treatment of capital defendants. 30 Despite his intri-
cate analysis of the semantics of "consideration," Justice Scalia was
really arguing against the Lockett policy goal of individualized treat-
ment of capital defendants.
A second consideration, therefore, is whether Lockett's individu-
alized sentencing and Penry's interpretation of Lockett result in arbi-
trary and capricious impositions of death sentences. Justice Scalia,
in his dissent in Penry, argued that the Court's decision concerning
the Texas statute gave the sentencer too much discretion and thus
increased the risk that the death penalty would be imposed arbitrar-
ily and capriciously as prohibited by Furman and Gregg.' 3 1 In
Furman, the Court struck down Georgia's death penalty statute as
unconstitutional because the Georgia statute allowed the sentencer
to impose the death penalty arbitrarily and capriciously.' 32 Justice
Douglas, for example, was concerned that a sentencer would selec-
tively apply the death penalty to prejudiced groups such as the poor
and racial minorities under the Georgia statute.133 He thus ex-
pressed a concern with basic fairness. Gregg upheld death penalties
in Georgia after the Georgia legislature set up guidelines for a sen-
tencing jury to impose the death penalty.13 4 The Court in Gregg
pointed out that ajury must be given guidance on the factors about
the crime and the defendant which would be relevant to the sentenc-
ing decision.' 35 Justice Scalia's argument in Penry is that the Court
in Penry left the jury with no guidance in determining whether to
apply the death penalty, leaving the jury to an "unguided, emotional
'moral response.' "136
However, is the discretion to consider and give effect to all rele-
129 Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
130 See supra note 114 for a discussion of the Lockett rationale.
131 109 S. Ct. at 2968-69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 304 (1972)).
132 408 U.S. at 274, 295 (Brennan, J., concurring); 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
133 Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
134 428 U.S. at 153.
135 Id. at 192.
136 Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2968 (1979) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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vant mitigating factors of a defendant necessarily arbitrary and ca-
pricious? The Court in Furman feared that juries were making
decisions on imposing the death penalty based on prejudices and
other irrelevant factors. Thus the Court in Furman and Gregg was
more concerned about procedural fairness rather than superficial
consistency in the sentences. The Penry decision allows the sen-
tencer to see the complete picture of the defendant in deciding his
level of culpability. With the information about the defendant, a
sentencer can weigh the various relevant mitigating factors'and ag-
gravating factors to give a "reasoned moral response to the defend-
ant's background, character, and crime."' 137 The jury's discretion is
still guided by a court's determination of what is relevant to a de-
fendant's background, character, and offense, and the jury is still
required to weigh the mitigating factors-against the aggravating fac-
tors. 138 A jury allowed to treat and respond to a defendant as a
three-dimensional individual is less likely to sentence a person to
death based on pure prejudice and ignorance. An informed deter-
mination of a defendant's culpability is clearly not arbitrary or capri-
cious. Thus, Justice O'Connor was absolutely correct in stating that
the full consideration of evidence of mitigating circumstances would
allow the jury to give a "'reasoned moral response to the defend-
ant's background, character, and crime.' "139 When a sentencer is
allowed to consider and give effect to the various mitigating circum-
stances, the imposition of the death penalty may appear to be incon-
sistent and therefore arbitrary. However, as pointed out in Eddings,
''a consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false
consistency." 14 0
B. THE DEATH PENALTY FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED: THE CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT QUESTION
In announcing the judgment of the Court in Penry, Justice
O'Connor held that the eighth amendment does not preclude the
execution of any mentally retarded criminal of Penry's ability by vir-
tue of his mental retardation.' 4 ' Justice O'Connor arrived at this
decision after concluding as follows: 1) sentencing Penry to death
would not have been cruel and unusual under traditonal common
137 Id. at 2951.
138 Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988) (finding the defendant's good behavior
in prison not clearly relevant to his character).
139 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2951 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)
(emphasis in original).
140 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
141 109 S. Ct. at 2958.
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law;' 42 2) there is no emerging national consensus against the ex-
ecuton of the mentally retarded as shown by state legislative ac-
tions; 143 and 3) not all mentally retarded people of Penry's ability
are incapable of having the degree of culpability proportionate to
and deserving of the death penalty.144
The Court has always ruled those punishments to be violative
of the eighth amendment which were already considered cruel and
unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted. 145 Justice
O'Connor's analysis clearly shows that while common law prohib-
ited capital punishment for the "idiots" or "lunatics," it was refer-
ring to the mentally insane and not the mentally retarded of Penry's
abilities. 146 Even Justice Brennan in his dissent did not challenge
this conclusion.' 4 7
The Court nevertheless seems to recognize that social values do
change and fluctuate. Thus, if there is an emerging national consen-
sus against a certain type of punishment reflecting the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"
the Court would consider that punishment to be a cruel and unusual
one as prohibited by the eighth amendment. 148 The Court deter-
mines whether there is a national consensus by observing the ac-
tions of the state legislatures. 149 The defense in Penry tried to prove
that there is a national consensus against the death penalty for the
mentally retarded by producing opinion polls of various states
against sentencing mentally retarded criminals to death.' 50 How-
ever, the Court in Penry noted that only one state, Georgia, has ex-
plicitly prohibited imposing the death penalty on the mentally
retarded and thus decided that there was no national consensus
against such a punishment. 15 1 In making this decision, Justice
O'Connor rightly rejected the use of opinion polls to determine na-
tional consensus. After all, opinion polls only show passing senti-
ments at a specific time while legislative actions shows more
142 Id. at 2954.
143 Id. at 2955.
144 Id. at 2956-57.
145 Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (death penalty for the mentally insane
criminal is cruel and unusual punishment).
146 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2954.
147 Id. at 2958-63 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
148 Id. at 2953 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
149 Id. In Ford, the Court noted that 26 states had statutes explicitly prohibiting the
death penalty for the mentally insane when the Court ruled that such punishment is
cruel and unusual when applied to the insane. 477 U.S. at 408 n.2.
150 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (No.
87-6177); Brief for the Petitioner at 38, Joint App. 279, 283, Penry (No. 87-6177).
151 109 S. Ct. at 2955.
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permanence because of the arduous process of lawmaking.1 52 Thus
Justice O'Connor was correct in deciding that there was no national
consensus against sentencing the mentally retarded criminal to
death. 153
Since neither the common law nor evolving standards of society
prohibit the death penalty for the mentally retarded capital of-
fender, the only remaining question is whether capital punishment
is proportional to the degree of culpability a mentally retarded crim-
inal is capable of having.1 54 Justice O'Connor was incorrect in de-
ciding that the death penalty for the mentally retarded was not cruel
and unusual under the proportionality test. Justice O'Connor rea-
soned that there are various degrees of mental retardation and men-
tally retarded people are individuals of various abilities. 155 For
example, mentally retarded persons may improve their mental abili-
ties by education, habilitation, and life experience.1 56 Thus, Justice
O'Connor could not conclude, because of the different levels of
mental abilities, that mentally retarded criminals generally lack the
degree of culpability associated with the death penalty.1 57 This rea-
soning shows a disturbing lack of understanding of the nature of
mentally retarded persons.
152 Unlike an opinion poll which may fluctuate, a law is usually the result of not only
public sentiment but public debate, committee hearings, lobbying by various groups,
and voting by the legislative body. An issue as controversial as the death penalty guar-
antees that any law dealing with the issue would have faced tremendous challenges and
intense struggle before being voted upon by the legislature. Such a law would clearly be
a better and more permanent representation of national consensus than a telephone
poll.
153 There is disagreement in the Court as to whether a proportionality test should be
used after the Court has determined that there is no national consensus against a certain
type of punishment. For instance, Justice Scalia would have stopped the analysis at this
point. In Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989), a death penalty case decided at
the same term as Penry, Justice Scalia argued strongly for the right of legislative bodies
to determine what the evolving standards are in defining cruel and unusual punishment.
Id. at 2979-80. He argued that the Court should only determine what the standards are
and not what they should be. Id. at 2979. He thus rejected the use of a proportionality
test as a judicial encroachment of legislative power. Id. at 2980. Justice Scalia's argu-
ments are flawed because the eighth amendment, along with the rest of the Bill of
Rights, was meant to be a check of the abuses of majority rule in a democracy. Id. at
2987 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As pointed out byJustice Brennan in his dissent in Stan-
ford, if the Court allows the legislature to define the eighth amendment, the Court will be
abrogating its constitutional role. Id. at 2987 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983). Solem held, inter alia, that not only must
a punishment be proportionate to the gravity of the offense, but also to the defendant's
moral culpability. Id.
155 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2956-57.
156 Id. at 2957 (citing Ellis & Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 414, 424, n.54 (1985) and Amicus Brief for AAMR at 6, Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.
Ct. 2934 (1989) (No. 86-6177)).
157 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2957.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
As pointed out by Justice O'Connor, mentally retarded persons
vary in their mental abilities. However, by clinical definition, all
mentally retarded people are below a certain level of mental capabil-
ities. 158 First, they are all severely handicapped in their mental abili-
ties although the level of severity may vary. By definition, they all
have "significant limitations in... meeting the standards of matura-
tion, learning, personal independence, and/or social responsibility
that are expected for his or her age level and cultural group....-159
Second, unlike mental illness, which can be cured, mental retarda-
tion is a permanent condition. 160 While learning, habilitation, and
life experience may improve the mental abilities of a mentally re-
tarded person, he/she will always be mentally retarded and there-
fore severely handicapped in his/her mental abilities. Finally, while
mentally retarded people are individuals, they frequenty have the
same disabling characteristics. Among these characteristics are lim-
ited communication skills, poor impulse control, and an incomplete
or immature concept of blameworthiness and causation.16 1 As
Justice Brennan concluded in his dissent, the disabilities and handi-
caps which mentally retarded persons, by definition, possess mean
that "the ultimate penalty of death is always and necessarily dispro-
portionate to [their] blameworthiness and hence is
unconstitutional." 162
The prosecution in Penry argued that the Court should not al-
low mental professionals and clinical definitions to control the ad-
ministration of criminal justice and that common law standards
should be controlling. 163 The problem with this argument is that
since mental retardation is an inherently mental health condition, it
is only reasonable that a court should rely on medical information
just as much as a court will admit expert witnesses for technical and
scientific matters. The need for mental health professionals' exper-
tise is especially important for mentally retarded defendants since
mentally retarded persons have long suffered an "irrational social
158 AMERICAN ASSOCIATIN ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETAR-
DATION 1 (H. Grossman ed. 1983). The American Association on Mental Deficiency
(AAMD) defines mental retardation as "significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested dur-
ing the developmental period." Id.
1-5 Id. at 11.
160 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 156, at 424.
161 Id. at 429.
162 Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2961 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
163 Brief for Respondent at 44-49, Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (No. 86-
6177).
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stigma" in the United States.'r 4
Another argument for sentencing mentally retarded criminals
to death is the argument that since the jury has already found Penry
to be competent to stand trial, he must have a rational understand-
ing of the court proceeding. 165 The jury also rejected Penry's in-
sanity defense, and therefore he could be convicted by the jury.166
However, just because a defendant is competent to stand trial and to
be convicted does not mean that he should be sentenced to death.
The Court has traditionally treated capital punishment with greater
sensitivity and care because capital punishment is "qualitatively dif-
ferent" from any other sentence. 167 This reasoning implies that the
imposition of the death penalty requires a higher standard than the
imposition of a regular sentence.
Considering the Court's special sensitivity toward the imposi-
tion of the death penalty, Justice O'Connor's conclusion is espe-
cially surprising. In essence, her reasoning is that since she cannot
conclude that all mentally retarded defendants should not be sen-
tenced to death, the general rule is that the death penalty for the
mentally retarded is not cruel and unusual. 168 Such a rule creates
the risk that a mentally retarded defendant who lacks the culpability
deserving of the death penalty may still be sentenced to death since
there is no guarantee that individualized consideration required by
Lockett will prevent such a sentence.' 69 The unique finality and
harshness of the death sentence makes such a risk unacceptable.
Indeed, the extreme severity of the death sentence requires that
there should always be a presumption toward life when a sentencer
is deciding whether or not to impose the death sentence. 170 When
164 Smith v. Francis, 474 U.S. 925, 927 (1985) (memorandum opinion denying certio-
rari) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
165 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2954.
166 Id.
167 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1977) (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 305 (1976)).
168 See Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2957.
169 Id. at 2962-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
170 This is not a novel idea. One of the underlying rationale for requiring the sen-
tencer to consider all mitigating circumstances of a capital defendant in assessing the
death penalty is the presumption toward life.
[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent
mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circum-
stances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty
will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When the
choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (emphasis added). It is therefore ironic that
Justice O'Connor supported the rationale of Lockett and still decided that it is not cruel
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in doubt, the Court should not impose the death penalty. Looking
at the language of her ruling, it is obvious thatJustice O'Connor was
not at all certain that mentally retarded criminals do have the culpa-
bility proportionate to the severity of the death penalty.' 7 ' It would
seem logical that considering the uncertainty in a mentally retarded
criminal's culpability and the certainty in the severity of the death
sentence, Justice O'Connor should have ruled that capital punish-
ment for the mentally retarded, as a general rule, is cruel and unu-
sual punishment.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
In Penry, the Court decided that a sentencer must be allowed to
consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating factors of a de-
fendant when deciding whether to impose the death penalty.' 72
What then, are the implications of the Court's decision? First, the
decision does not require the Texas legislature to amend the statu-
tory scheme for the death penalty. 173 However, when juries are the
sentencers, courts in Texas and elsewhere must give special instruc-
tions informing the juries that they should consider and give effect
to relevant mitigating circumstances of the defendant. 174 Second,
sentencers, whether they are judges or juries, will have a great deal
of discretion in deciding whether a criminal is deserving of the
death penalty because they are entitled to consider and give effect to
a large number of relevant mitigating factors. Third, this discretion
is not unlimited in that a mitigating factor must be relevant to the
defendant's background, character, and to the circumstances of the
and unusual punishment to sentence mentally retarded criminals to death when she has
serious doubts about the mentally retarded criminal's culpability.
171 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2957. Justice O'Connor stated, "I cannot conclude that all men-
tally retarded people of Penry's ability ... inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and
moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty."
Id. (emphasis added). An inability to conclude is hardly a sign of certainty.
172 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2952.
173 In fact, the defense never challenged the facial validity of the Texas statutes. It did
contend that, in this case, the jury was unable to fully consider Penry's mitigating cir-
cumstances unless the trial court gave a special instruction to the jury to consider mental
retardation and abused childhood. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2945.
174 Thus, the Court decided in Penry that because of the lack of such a special instruc-
tion, the special issues could have prevented the jury from considering and giving effect
to Penry's mental retardation and abused childhood. Id. at 2952. Arguably, if a state's
death penalty statute clearly allows the jury to consider and give effect to mitigating
factors at issue in a case, the trial court would not need to give the special instruction.
When the judge is the sentencer, he or she should interpret the death penalty statute
broadly so that he or she can consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating factors of
a defendant.
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offense. 175 Nevertheless, this would still leave the sentencer with a
broad range of factors to consider. Furthermore, courts will con-
tinue to struggle with the question of when a potential mitigating
factor is relevant to the defendant's character, background, and
offense.
The Court also ruled that it is not cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the eighth amendment to sentence a mentally retarded
criminal of Penry's reasoning abilities to death. 176 Note the wording
of the ruling. The implication is that sentencing to death a criminal
who is mentally retarded to a degree greater than Penry may be pro-
hibited by the eighth amendment. The Court, however, did not de-
fine at what level the eighth amendment prohibits the death penalty
for the mentally retarded criminal.
The voting pattern of the Court also has definite implications
for future cases involving capital punishment issues. Justice
O'Connor casted the deciding vote in Penry. Although she an-
nounced the opinion of the Court, the four votes she received for
her decision on the constitutionality of the Texas court's application
of the Texas statutory scheme were not the four votes she received
for her decision on the constitutionality of capital punishment for
the mentally retarded criminal. 177 She thus crafted a decision be-
tween two sharply divided blocs, gaining partial consent from each
side.
The Court's voting pattern was similar to two other recent
Supreme Court decisions concerning the death penalty. In Thomp-
son v. Oklahoma,178 the Court, in a 5-3 decision, overturned
Oklahoma's imposition of the death penalty for a defendant who
committed murder when he was fifteen years old. 179 Based on the
narrow statutory ground that the Oklahoma statute set no minimum
175 Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2948. For instance, the Court cited Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487
U.S. 164, (1988), which found the defendant's good behavior in prison not clearly rele-
vant to his character. Id.
176 109 S. Ct. at 2958.
177 Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmum supported Justice O'Connor's
ruling against this application of the Texas statutory scheme for assessing the death
penalty. The same four justices disagreed with Justice O'Connor's position that sen-
tencing a mentally retarded criminal of Penry's reasoning ability was not cruel and unu-
sual punishment. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2959, 2963. Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White, and
Kennedy disagreed withJustice O'Connor's position on the Texas statutory scheme but
agreed with her position on the constitutionality of death penalty for the mentally re-
tarded criminal. Id. at 2963-64.
178 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
179 Id. at 2700. For an in-depth analysis of the Thompson decision, see Note, Eighth
Amendment-The Death Penalty for Juveniles: A State's Right or a Child's Injustice?, 79J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 921 (1988) (supporting the Thompson decision because it meets the
precepts and objects of the juvenile justice system).
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age for the death penalty, Justice O'Connorjoined the decision with
a separate concurring opinion. 8 0 Justice Kennedy did not partici-
pate in the decision. If he had, it probably would have been a 5-4
decision and Justice O'Connor's vote would have been pivotal since
Justice Kennedy voted with Justice Scalia in Stanford v. Kentucky.' 8'
Thus, in Stanford, Justice O'Connor's vote was pivotal. In that case,
Justice O'Connor joined the decision to uphold Kentucky's death
sentence for a defendant who committed murder when he was six-
teen years old because there was a clear national consensus support-
ing the death penalty for criminals who were between sixteen and
seventeen years old. 18 2
These recent cases, along with Penry v. Lynaugh, show that Jus-
tice O'Connor is a crucial swing vote on capital punishment issues.
She will probably continue to be an influential voice in future cases
dealing with the death penalty.
The voting pattern in Penry further indicates that the Court is
still unable to arrive at anything close to a consensus on issues deal-
ing with the death penalty. For the past two decades, the Court has
handed down plurality opinions on issues involving the death pen-
alty. 18 3 As shown earlier, the most recent cases on capital punish-
ment were decided with the barest of margins. Penry itself is a 5-4
decision with three separate opinions concurring in part and dis-
senting in part. This means that future decisions on death penalty
issues will continue to be unpredictable, uncertain, and even
confusing.
180 Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun, which held that the death penalty for a defendant who committed first-
degree murder when he was 15 years old was cruel and unusual punishment under the
eighth amendment. Id. at 2700. Justice O'Connor agreed with the decision to overturn
the sentence but she did so on the narrow ground that the Oklahoma statute did not set
a minimum age for the death penalty. Id. at 2711. Justice O'Connor reasoned that there
is a risk that the Oklahoma legislature either did not intend to apply the death penalty to
15 year olds, or the legislature never seriouly considered the matter. Id. Furthermore,
because there is no clear indication of a national consensus supporting the death penalty
for 15 year old criminals, the Oklahoma statute cannot be constitutional. Id.
181 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2972 (1989).
182 Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, and
Kennedy. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989). Justice O'Connor once again
wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmum, and Stevens. Id.
183 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (five separate concurring opin-
ions and four separate dissenting opinions); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
(four separate concurring opinions and two dissenting opinions); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 264 (1976) (four concurring opinions and two dissenting opinions).
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V. CONCLUSION
The lack of consensus in the Court in Penry and other capital
punishment cases results in unpredictability and uncertainty in
Supreme Court jurisprudence on capital punishments. Meanwhile,
this lack of consensus has given Justice O'Connor an influential
voice on death penalty decisions.
The Court's decision to allow a sentencer to consider and give
effect to all relevant mitigating circumstances of a defendant follows
the policy of individualized treatment espoused in Lockett without
violating the prohibition against arbitrary and capricious death
sentences announced in Furman. The decision thereby ensures pro-
cedural fairness in the imposition of the death penalty.
The Court is incorrect in not ruling that the death penalty for
the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual punishment under the
eighth amendment. By definition, all mentally retarded defendants
are severely handicapped in their mental abilities. While capital
punishment for the mentally retarded is not prohibited by common
law or national consensus, it certainly violates the proportionality
test because mentally retarded criminals lack the culpability deserv-
ing of the death sentence.
Finally, because of the unique finality and harshness of the
death penalty, the Court should always rule in favor of life if there
are 'any doubts or uncertainities about the correctness of the
sentence.
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